Larry Jones v. Yolinsky by unknown
2016 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-27-2016 
Larry Jones v. Yolinsky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016 
Recommended Citation 
"Larry Jones v. Yolinsky" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 722. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/722 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 
 
ALD-351        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2106 
___________ 
 
LARRY JONES, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SGT. YOLINSKY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-15-cv-00099) 
District Judge:  Honorable Susan Paradise Baxter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 21, 2016 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 27, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                                                
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Larry Jones appeals from the Magistrate Judge’s order granting 
Appellee Sergeant Yolinsky’s motion for summary judgment and denying Jones’s motion 
for summary judgment.1  Because we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial 
question, we will summarily affirm the judgment below.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 
10.6. 
I. 
 Jones, a prisoner at State Correctional Institution – Forest, acting pro se, filed this 
civil rights action against Sergeant Yolinsky, an employee of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections.  Jones alleged that, after he transferred into SCI-Forest in 
March of 2014, Yolinsky targeted him for retaliation for a lawsuit that he had filed 
against Yolinsky in 2004.  Jones further alleged that, as a result of Yolinsky’s actions, in 
May of 2014, Jones was placed in administrative custody for 192 days.  Jones’s 
Complaint stated both due process and retaliation claims.  Yolinsky, on the other hand, 
maintained that he merely informed SCI-Forest of alleged threats that Jones had made 
against him in the past and was not involved in decision-making regarding Jones’s 
placement in administrative custody.  The Magistrate Judge granted summary judgment 
on all claims to Yolinsky, ruling that he had no personal involvement in Jones’s 
placement in administrative custody and thus could not be held liable.  Jones now 
appeals. 
                                                                
1 The parties consented to disposition of this matter by the Magistrate Judge.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 636(c). 
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of 
orders granting motions for summary judgment is plenary.  See McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 
F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).  We will summarily affirm because Jones’s appeal presents 
no substantial question.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 
 We agree with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Jones failed to produce 
evidence suggesting that Sergeant Yolinsky was personally involved in or had actual 
knowledge of, and acquiesced to, the commission of any alleged constitutional violation.  
Here, Jones only broadly alleged that Yolinsky triggered the process by which he was 
held in administrative custody by others.  Jones has not alleged Yolinsky’s knowledge 
and acquiescence with the required particularity, nor has Jones offered evidence tending 
to show that Yolinsky had the necessary level of involvement in the underlying allegedly 
unconstitutional retaliatory conduct for the claim against him to survive summary 
judgment.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding 
that a plaintiff must allege “with appropriate particularity” that the defendants “have 
personal involvement in the alleged wrongs [which] . . . can be shown through allegations 
of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence”).  To the contrary, the 
record reflects that Yolinsky’s involvement is extremely limited – namely, to the sole act 
of submitting the Incident Report informing SCI-Forest of his history with Jones and his 
belief that a Separation Order was in place due to Jones’s prior threats against him.  
Based on the undisputed record, Yolinsky did not participate in issuing the DC-141 Other 
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Report that placed him in administrative custody pending a transfer and he did not 
participate in any of the Program Review Committee reviews that extended that 
segregation.  Put more simply, even if one were to assume an incident of retaliation did 
occur, there is no evidence that Yolinsky was personally involved in the violation of 
Jones’s constitutional rights.2 
 Even if Yolinsky had been personally involved, the District Court still properly 
granted him summary judgment.  A prisoner claiming that prison officials have retaliated 
against him for exercising his rights under the First Amendment must prove that, inter 
alia, he suffered an “adverse action” at their hands.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 
(3d Cir. 2001).  However, defendants can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
they “would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for reasons 
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”  Id. at 334.  Here, the record 
reveals a clear legitimate penological basis underlying the decision to house Jones, who 
had made threats against a corrections officer, in administrative custody: prison security.  
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“Prison administrators . . . should be 
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices 
that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain 
institutional security.”).  
                                                                
2 Yolinsky introduced several affidavits of prisoners who swore to have overheard 
Yolinsky make disparaging remarks about Jones. This cannot overcome Jones’s lack of 
personal involvement in any specifically alleged constitutional violation. 
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 Finally, Jones fares no better as to the claim that his due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment were violated when he was placed in administrative custody 
pending a transfer out of SCI-Forest.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not create an inherent liberty interest to remain free from administrative 
custody unless it would create an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in 
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”  Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 
(1995).  The summary judgment record is devoid of any facts suggesting that Jones’s 
transfer to administrative custody for 192 days resulted in “atypical and significant 
hardship.”  See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997) (exposure to the 
conditions of administrative custody for periods of as long as 15 months is not atypical 
and does not deprive prisoners of a liberty interest).  Because Jones’s claim does not 
implicate a liberty interest, Yolinsky was entitled to summary judgment as to this claim. 
III. 
 For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question.  
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the Magistrate Judge’s order granting Yolinsky 
summary judgment and denying Jones summary judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 
I.O.P. 10.6.  
